MATTHEW F. LEITMAN, District Judge.
This is a reinsurance coverage dispute between Movant Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company ("Amerisure"), and its reinsurer, Respondent Everest Reinsurance Company ("Everest"). After a nine-day, highly-contentious arbitration hearing, an arbitration panel awarded Amerisure over $14 million. Amerisure now moves to confirm the arbitration award (see ECF #2); Everest moves to vacate it. (See ECF #23.) For all of the reasons stated below, the Court
Amerisure is a property and casualty insurance company. In 1979, Amerisure purchased "reinsurance" from Everest. "`In essence, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies,' whereby a reinsured (here, [Amerisure]), cedes some of its risk to a reinsurer (in this case, [Everest]), and shares its premium with the reinsurer." Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 580, 582 n. 1 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 729 n. 1 (7th Cir.2005)). Amerisure purchased its reinsurance from Everest under a series of treaties.
The treaty in place between July 1979 and July 1988 is referred to as the "Direct Access Treaty." (See ECF #28-1.) This treaty was amended several times while it was in force. (See the "Endorsements," id. at 3-27, Pg. ID 242-266.)
The Direct Access Treaty provided that "with respect to each occurrence," Everest would indemnify Amerisure for the amount of "net loss under [the] casualty business of [Amerisure] ... in excess of the `Company Retention.'" (Id. at 40, Pg. ID 279.) The Direct Access Treaty defined an "occurrence" as "each accident or occurrence
The original version of the Direct Access Treaty included five specifically-numbered exclusions from coverage.
The original version of the Direct Access Treaty also contained an exception to the listed exclusions. This exception provided that an otherwise-applicable exclusion would not bar indemnification if the trigger for the exclusion was merely an incidental part of the insured's overall operations:
(The "Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the Treaties' Exclusions," id. at 41, Pg. ID 280.)
Effective July 1, 1987, the parties adopted an endorsement to the Direct Access Treaty. (See the "1987 Endorsement," id. at 6-7, Pg. ID 245-246.) The 1987 Endorsement added four new specifically-numbered coverage exclusions beyond the five exclusions listed in the original treaty. The newly-added ninth exclusion precluded indemnification for certain asbestos-related losses if either (1) Amerisure knew that its insured's operations presented a risk of asbestos exposure or (2) the insured's asbestos exposure was generally recognized (the "Asbestos Exclusion"). But this new exclusion provided that it did not apply to (and would not preclude indemnification for) certain specified asbestos-related activities if those activities were merely incidental to an insured's operations (the "Incidental Exception Language in the Asbestos Exclusion"). The entire text of this exclusion was as follows:
(Id. at 6-7, Pg. ID 245-246.)
The 1987 Endorsement expressly provided that all of the Direct Access Treaty's "other terms and conditions" — i.e., those not specifically modified or deleted in the endorsement — "shall remain unchanged." (Id. at 9, Pg. ID 248.) The 1987 Endorsement did not purport to modify or delete the Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the Treaties' Exclusions. Thus, the modified version of the Direct Access Treaty contained both the Incidental Exception Language in the Asbestos Exclusion and the Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the Treaties' Exclusions.
In 1988 and 1989, Everest provided reinsurance to Amerisure under a series of six additional contracts that the parties refer to as the "Woods Treaties" (together with the Direct Access Treaty, the "Treaties"). (See ECF ##28-2-287.) The Woods Treaties expressly stated that Amerisure was permitted to aggregate individual losses in order to satisfy its $500,000 deductible. (See, e.g., ECF #28-2 at 13, Pg. ID 307.) Except for this difference, the Woods Treaties and the Direct Access Treaty were similar in all respects relevant to this dispute. For example, the Woods Treaties contained virtually the same Asbestos Exclusion included in the 1987 Endorsement to the Direct Access Treaty.
The Treaties all contained arbitration provisions that required the parties to submit "any dispute arising out of [the treaties] ... to the decision of a board comprised of two arbitrators and an umpire...." (Direct Access Treaty at 34-35, Pg. ID 273-274; see also the Woods Treaties at ECF #28-2 at 19-20, Pg. ID 313-314.) The arbitration provision in the Direct Access Treaty stated that "the laws of the State of Michigan shall govern any arbitration proceedings." (Direct Access Treaty at 34, Pg. ID 273.) The Woods Treaties did not contain any choice-of-law provision. (See, e.g., ECF #28-2 at 19-20, Pg. ID 313-314; ECF #28-3 at 18, Pg. ID 343; ECF #28-4 at 19-20, Pg. ID 373-374; ECF #28-5 at 17-18, Pg. ID 402403; ECF #28-6 at 18-19, Pg. ID 432-433; ECF #28-7 at 17-18, Pg. ID 461-462.)
During the terms of the Treaties, Amerisure provided insurance coverage to a
In 2006, Amerisure notified Everest that [
In 2009, Amerisure sought indemnification from Everest for the Amerisure Asbestos Losses. Everest rejected Amerisure's claim on May 3, 2010. (See the "Denial Letter," ECF #32-19 at 3-4, Pg. ID 1218-1219.) In the Denial Letter, Everest asserted that the Direct Access Treaty "required" Amerisure to satisfy its $500,000 deductible "on a per occurrence" basis. (Id. at 3, Pg. ID 1218.) In other words, Everest contended that Amerisure could not aggregate the individual losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses into a single "occurrence" in order to exceed the Company Retention and thereby qualify for indemnification.
Everest also asserted that the Asbestos Exclusion, as included in the 1987 Endorsement and in the Woods Treaties, precluded indemnification for the Amerisure Asbestos Losses. (See id.) Everest contended that [
Amerisure demanded arbitration on October 10, 2011. (See ECF #32-20, Pg. ID 1221-1222.) In its arbitration demand, Amerisure wrote that it had "made certain payments pursuant to [its insurance policies with] [
Amerisure and Everest each appointed one arbitrator to the three-member hearing panel (the "Panel"). Amerisure chose Andrew Maneval ("Maneval"), and Everest chose James White ("White"). The parties then proceeded to choose a neutral "umpire" to complete the Panel. While the Treaties specified that the two party-selected arbitrators would jointly choose the umpire, it appears that Everest suggested a different process. (See, e.g., ECF ##41-3, 41-4, Pg. ID 2155, 21572159.) Everest proposed that the parties simultaneously exchange lists, each identifying six
It is unclear from the record before this Court whether Amerisure agreed to this "ranking" procedure in its entirety. However, Amerisure did send a list of six proposed umpires to Everest on February 17, 2012. (See ECF #33-13, Pg. ID 1438.) One of the umpires Amerisure listed was Roger Moak ("Moak"), an experienced umpire in the insurance/reinsurance industry. (See id.)
On February 29, 2014, counsel for Amerisure and Everest jointly e-mailed Moak, informed him that he had been nominated as an umpire candidate, and asked that he fill out a questionnaire addressing, among other things, his prior dealings with the parties, their counsel, and their party-selected arbitrators. (See ECF #41-5, Pg. ID 2161-2169.) Moak completed the questionnaire and disclosed that he had previously been appointed as an arbitrator "in an arbitration against Everest," but that the case had settled prior to arbitration. (Moak's Completed Questionnaire, ECF #31-12 at 2, Pg. ID 795.) Moak also disclosed that he had never served on an arbitration panel with Maneval, that he had participated in arbitrations with White, and that he had previously served as an umpire in cases involving Amerisure's counsel. (See id. at 3-4, Pg. ID 796-797.) Ultimately, the parties selected Moak as the umpire and informed Moak of his selection in a joint communication from Maneval and White. (See ECF #28-9, Pg. ID 483-484.) There is no evidence in the record before the Court that Moak was ever told how he had been selected to serve as the umpire and/or told anything about the role of either party in his selection.
The arbitration hearing was scheduled to begin in June 2013. On May 17, 2013, Everest requested an adjournment. (See ECF #32-23, Pg. ID 1230-1238.) Everest told the Panel that "a recent development drastically reshape[d] the issues in this matter." (Id. at 1, Pg. ID 1230.) Everest said that it received documents from [
Following Everest's additional discovery, the arbitration hearing began on April 24, 2014. That same day, Everest's counsel
Moak nonetheless attempted to list the arbitrations in which attorneys from the law firms representing Everest and Amerisure were involved and had potentially nominated him. (See id. at 307-310, Pg. ID 2152.) Moak further said that he thought "he [had] been nominated in a couple of cases in which Mr. Maneval is an arbitrator but I didn't — I wasn't retained. And I may have been nominated in a couple of cases in which Mr. White was an arbitrator and I wasn't retained. But I didn't have time to do the research necessary to figure all that out." (Id. at 309, Pg. ID 2152.)
Before the hearing began, Moak made a further disclosure about interactions he had with the two party-selected arbitrators, Maneval and White:
(Id. at 457-458, ECF #41-2 at Pg. ID 2153.)
During a nine-day arbitration hearing, the Panel heard testimony from more than a dozen witnesses (including experts) and reviewed scores of exhibits. Three contested issues before the Panel are now at issue in this action. Those issues were:
At various times during the arbitration, Moak appeared frustrated with how Everest
(Id. at 2527-2529, Pg. ID 837.)
At the conclusion of the hearing on May 7, 2014, Moak asked counsel for Everest if he had any objections as to how the Panel allowed Everest to present its case, and counsel for Everest identified only a single objection:
(Arb. Tr. at 3655-3656, ECF #40-6, Pg. ID 1992-1993.)
On May 13, 2014, prior to the start of the Panel's deliberations, Everest sought sanctions on the ground that Amerisure "flouted its discovery obligations in this matter and thereby deprived Everest of key evidence." (ECF #31-25 at 2, Pg. ID 859.) Everest argued that "[t]he prejudice resulting from Amerisure's failure to engage in good faith discovery is not calculable, but has been exacerbated by the Panel's denial of Everest's right to introduce pertinent and material evidence at the final hearing, and the Panel applying a different standard to Everest with respect to the introduction of evidence." (Id.; emphasis added.)
Everest's allegations irritated Moak. In a May 14, 2014, e-mail to Maneval and White, Moak wrote:
(ECF #32-27 at 4, Pg. ID 1260.)
Following the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, but before the Panel issued its ruling, Moak made an additional disclosure to the parties. Moak wrote in an e-mail, sent over the July Fourth holiday, that "in accordance with my continuing disclosure obligation, I was notified this morning that I have been selected as an umpire in an arbitration in which Mr. Maneval is a party-appointed arbitrator." (ECF #31-18, Pg. ID 815.)
At no time did either party seek to disqualify Moak due to his relationships or past interactions with the parties or attorneys involved in the arbitration. Nor did either party ever seek to disqualify Moak on any grounds. While Everest complained in its sanctions motion that "the Panel" applied a different standard to Everest's request to admit evidence, Everest never suggested during the arbitration that Moak was unfit to serve as umpire nor suggested that he harbored a bias that prevented him from being fair.
Following in-person deliberations, the Panel issued its "Decision and Final Award" on July 25, 2014. (See the "Final Award," ECF #22-2, Pg. ID 182-188.) Moak and Maneval signed the Final Award; White issued a dissent. (See White's dissent, ECF #31-20.)
The Panel began the Final Award by providing a "procedural history" of the dispute. (See id. at 1-3, Pg. ID 182-184.) In this section, the Panel explained that "[a]fter due deliberation" the Panel had ruled "on the morning of the hearing's final day that the [
The Panel then provided its "Findings and Conclusions." (See id. at 3-6, Pg. ID 184-187.) Before listing these conclusions in numbered paragraphs, the Panel first noted that it did "not intend to comment [in the Final Award] on every noteworthy witness and exhibit in this arbitration." (Id. at 4, Pg. ID 185.) Instead, the Panel said that it intended "to provide the Parties with the findings and conclusions upon which [its] rulings on the principal issues have most heavily relied. Of course, [the Panel's failure] to mention additional or contrary evidence and testimony is not intended to imply that it was not considered by the Panel." (Id.)
The Panel first noted that the meaning of the key disputed contract terms was far from clear and that it was applying rules of contract construction applicable to ambiguous language:
(Id. at 4, ¶¶ 2-3, Pg. ID 185.)
The Panel then explained that based upon its review of the testimony, evidence, and case law, it had determined that the Direct Access Treaty did allow Amerisure to aggregate the individual losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses into a single "occurrence":
(Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 5-7, Pg. ID 185-186.)
The Panel next turned to whether the Asbestos Exclusion prohibited Amerisure's claim for indemnification for the Amerisure Asbestos Losses. The Panel explained that in considering that issue, it had to analyze both the exclusion itself and whether an exception to the exclusion applied:
(Id. at 5, ¶ 8, Pg. ID 186.)
The Panel concluded that [
(Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 9-10, Pg. ID 186-187.)
Importantly, the Panel then ruled that even if the Asbestos Exclusion otherwise applied, Amerisure could nonetheless avoid that exclusion by operation of the Generally-Applicable
Finally, the Panel discussed whether Amerisure could avoid the Asbestos Exclusion by operation of a second exception to that exclusion — namely, the Incidental Exception Language in the Asbestos Exclusion:
(Id. at 6, ¶ 11, Pg. ID 187.)
The Panel did not award Amerisure all of the relief that it sought. For example, the Panel, by a unanimous vote, "[d]enie[d] Amerisure's demands for interests and attorney fees." (Id. at 7, ¶ g, Pg. ID 188.)
On July 31, 2014, Amerisure filed its Motion to Confirm Final Arbitration Award in this Court. (See the "Motion to Confirm," ECF #2.) Everest filed its Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration Award on October 24, 2014. (See the "Motion to Vacate," ECF #23.)
Everest moves to vacate the Final Award on four primary grounds: (1) Moak displayed "evident partiality" and was biased against Everest, (2) the Panel denied Everest a fair hearing; (3) the Panel exceeded its powers when it ruled that Amerisure could aggregate the individual asbestos losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses and that the Asbestos Exclusion did not preclude coverage; and (4) the Panel exceeded its powers when it awarded damages for amounts Amerisure paid to [
The Final Award covers seven reinsurance treaties — and various revisions and endorsements — that the parties executed during their relationship. All of the contracts involve interstate commerce and are thus subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. See Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., Ltd., 512 F.3d 294, 303 (6th Cir.2008). But even where the FAA applies, parties may contractually agree that state law governs their arbitration proceedings, and federal courts will generally enforce such an agreement. See Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 708, 715-716 (6th Cir.2014).
Here, one of the reinsurance treaties — the original 1979 Direct Access Treaty — provides that "the law of the State of Michigan shall govern any arbitration proceedings." (Direct Access Treaty at 34, Pg. ID 273.) This provision arguably requires application of Michigan law to a
These divergent choice of law provisions could create a thorny conflicts question. But they do not. "The first imperative of a conflict-of-laws problem is: a conflict. When all roads lead to the same result, there is no conflict to resolve." In re Dow Corning Corp., 778 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir.2015) (Sutton, J. dissenting). And here, there is scant conflict between Michigan arbitration law and the FAA. Indeed, "Michigan's arbitration law is almost identical to the FAA in all relevant respects." Uhl, 512 F.3d at 303.
Everest acknowledges that "Michigan law is similar to the FAA as to the legal standards governing" essentially all of its challenges to the Final Award — those based upon the "evident partiality [of the Umpire], the panel's refusal to hear evidence, the panel's conduct of the hearing, and the panel's consideration of post-hearing information on damages." (Everest's Supp. Br., ECF #45 at 3, Pg. ID 2476.) Since the "choice-of-law determination bears little impact on [the Court's] analysis or disposition" of those challenges to the Final Award, the Court need not decide whether Michigan law displaces the FAA with respect to them. Savers, 748 F.3d at 716. The Court will analyze them under the FAA.
But this Court must "consider specific application of Michigan law where the relevant provisions [of that law and the FAA] differ in substance." Id. Everest insists that Michigan law and the FAA differ with respect to "the standard of review applicable to whether the panel exceeded its powers in ruling in Amerisure's favor on the occurrence and asbestos exclusion issues under the Direct Access Treaty." (Everest's Supp. Br. at 3, Pg. ID 2476.) Everest argues that Michigan law permits a much more searching review of whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority. (Id.) (citing Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch. v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418, 430 (1982)). However, the difference, if any, between Michigan law and the FAA with regard to reviewing whether the Panel exceeded its powers is not nearly as significant as Everest suggests.
Under the FAA, "[t]he burden of proving that the arbitrators exceeded their authority is very great...." Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Home Insurance Company, 330 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir.2003)). "The terms of the contract define the powers of the arbitrator, and `as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.'" Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)); see also Michigan Sugar Co. v. Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers, and Grain Millers International Union, 278 Fed.Appx. 623, 628 (6th Cir.2008) (no basis to vacate arbitration award "even if the Arbitrator made a `bizarre' and `unsupported' finding because [courts] are directed to tolerate
Likewise, under Michigan law, "[h]istorically, judicial review of arbitration awards [has been] highly limited." Miller v. Miller, 474 Mich. 27, 707 N.W.2d 341, 345 (2005) (citing Gavin, 331 N.W.2d at 418).
Given the substantial similarities between Michigan law and the FAA, there is no need to determine whether Michigan law displaces the FAA with respect to Everest's claim that the Panel exceeded its powers in interpreting the Treaties. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will analyze Everest's argument that the Panel exceeded its powers under both the FAA and Michigan law.
Everest first moves to vacate the Final Award on the ground that "Moak exhibited evident partiality." (Everest Br., ECF
Everest cites Moak's May 14, 2013, e-mail as further evidence of Moak's partiality. According to Everest, the e-mail shows that Moak was initially inclined to rule in its favor, but that he "changed on his minds on the merits" and "ruled against Everest in all material respects" in retaliation for the criticisms Everest levied against him. (Id. at 24-25, Pg. ID 1104-1105.)
"As a general rule, a grievant must object to an arbitrator's partiality at the arbitration hearing before such an objection will be considered by the federal courts." Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corporation, 879 F.2d 1344, 1358-1359 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Questar Capital Corporation v. Gorter, 909 F.Supp.2d 789, 814 (W.D.Ky.2012) ("A party cannot remain silent as to perceived or actual partiality or bias and then later object after the [arbitration] panel reaches an unfavorable decision"). Everest did not object to Moak's partiality during the arbitration. On the contrary, when given a clear opportunity to claim that it had been harmed by Moak's partiality — at the close of the arbitration hearing, when Moak asked Everest directly if Everest had been given a sufficient "opportunity to present [its] arguments and [its] evidence" — Everest said nothing about any alleged partiality. (See Arb. Tr. at 3655-3656, ECF #40-6 at Pg. ID 1992-1993.) To be sure, Everest did vigorously object to the merits of many rulings made by Moak — before, during, and after the arbitration hearing — but an objection that an arbitrator or umpire made an incorrect legal ruling is manifestly different from an objection to that individual's ability to be fair.
At the motion hearing before this Court, Everest suggested that its failure to object to Moak's alleged partiality should be excused. Everest cited the Sixth Circuit's decision in Thomas Kinkade Company v. White, 711 F.3d 719, 724-725 (6th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that objecting to a neutral arbitrator's partiality may offend the neutral, and Everest suggested that it acted reasonably in withholding an objection to Moak's partiality. But Kinkade does not authorize this Court to review Everest's evident partiality claim even though Everest failed to raise the issue with Moak. The Sixth Circuit in Kinkade simply emphasized that a neutral arbitrator should not engage in conduct that places a party in the uncomfortable position of having to object to his partiality. The court did not take the additional step — urged by Everest here — of holding that an objection to a neutral's partiality
Since Everest did not object to Moak's partiality during the arbitration, Everest has failed to preserve essentially all of its partiality challenge. At a minimum, it has no right to challenge Moak's partiality based upon events occurring before and/or during the arbitration hearing because such a challenge could have been presented to Moak prior to the Final Award. The only aspect of Everest's evident partiality claim that is preserved is Everest's argument that Moak's post-hearing, pre-deliberation e-mail establishes his evident partiality.
Even though the Court concludes that Everest has preserved only a tiny fraction of its evident partiality claim, the Court will review the entire claim on the merits. The claim fails.
An arbitration award may be vacated on the basis of evident partiality only where "a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration." Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1358. In order to warrant relief, "[t]he alleged partiality must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, and the party asserting evident partiality must establish specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of the arbitrator." Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 329 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, a claim of evident partiality requires two showings: (1) a motive for the alleged bias and (2) "concrete actions in which [the arbitrator] appeared to actually favor" the disadvantaged party. Kinkade, 711 F.3d at 724. Everest has shown neither.
Everest has failed to establish that Moak had any motive to favor Amerisure. Everest hypothesizes that Moak treated Amerisure better because he wanted to secure additional umpire engagements from Amerisure and its counsel (see Everest Br., ECF #32 at 12-13, Pg. ID 1092-93), but this theory is both illogical and unsupported by the facts in this
Everest also lacks evidentiary support for its claim that Moak had a motive to favor Amerisure. There is no evidence in this record that Moak knew which party nominated him as the umpire nor that he knew how he was ultimately selected to serve in that capacity. Moreover, as Everest acknowledged on the record during the arbitration proceedings, neutral umpires may often not know which party nominated them. (Arb. Tr. at 307, ECF #41-2 at Pg. ID 2152.) Everest has failed to show that Moak had any reason to believe that favoring Amerisure would benefit him financially down the road.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Moak attempted to hide any arbitration engagements involving Amerisure's counsel and/or Amerisure's party-arbitrator (Maneval). In fact, the record establishes just the opposite: Moak disclosed his relationships with the other arbitrators and the lawyers, and he even e-mailed the parties over the Fourth of July weekend to inform them he was chosen as an umpire in another case in which Maneval was an arbitrator. It is telling that during the arbitration hearing, Everest never suggested that any of Moak's disclosed engagements gave him a motive to favor Amerisure.
And Everest makes far too much of Moak's May 14th e-mail. Everest views the e-mail as a "smoking gun" — as definitive proof that Moak must have ruled against Everest based upon his animus toward the company. Everest's argument is as follows: (1) Moak's e-mail shows that
There are two fundamental flaws in Everest's argument. First, in the e-mail, Moak said that even after Everest's "accusations," he was "still ... inclined" to rule in Everest's favor, and he committed that he would "put aside" his frustration with Everest "whenever we get to deliberate." (ECF #32-27 at 4, Pg. ID 1260; emphasis added.) Thus, Moak's statements in his e-mail, when read in their entirety, undercut Everest's claim that its accusations and criticisms led Moak to change his mind.
Second, Everest's argument omits a critical event that occurred between Moak's e-mail and the Final Award: the face-to-face deliberations between and among the Panel. Everest too quickly dismisses the possibility that the deliberations could have been meaningful; that Amerisure's party arbitrator, Maneval, may have been more persuasive than Everest's party arbitrator; and that Moak may have discarded his initial inclination in favor of Everest after carefully reviewing the evidence and considering Maneval's views.
Everest also places far too much emphasis on Moak's statement that he was "piss[ed] off." The fact that Moak may have been frustrated (even extremely frustrated) with Everest as he headed into deliberations does not mean he lost the capacity to fairly evaluate Everest's position on the merits. Indeed, it is not uncommon for decision-makers like arbitrators and judges to grow frustrated with attorneys for a wide variety of reasons, including criticisms of their rulings. Feeling that frustration is a natural part of the job; it is not evidence that the decision-maker cannot fulfill his oath and duty to be fair. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 1999) ("A court's statement to counsel that indicates frustration with counsel's behavior is not enough to establish bias or prejudice").
Everest has also failed to show that Moak materially favored Amerisure in an unfair manner. Everest likens this case to Kinkade in which the Sixth Circuit held that an arbitrator unfairly favored one party. In Kinkade, "the coincidences all [broke] one way." Kinkade, 711 F.3d at 720 (emphasis added). That did not happen here. Indeed, Everest's own complaints of unfair treatment show conclusively that Moak did not always favor Amerisure. For instance, Everest complains that Moak held a grudge because Everest moved to adjourn the originally May 2013 hearing date, but Everest cannot escape the fact that Moak granted Everest's urgent request for the adjournment, and reopened discovery — all over Amerisure's vigorous objections. Similarly, Everest complains that at the start of the hearing, Moak refused to admit into evidence a substantial number of documentary exhibits proposed by Everest. But Moak did allow Everest to offer the documents into evidence individually during the course of the hearing (with him ruling on their admissibility as they were offered) and Moak denied Amerisure's request to exclude the exhibits. (See ECF #32-30, Pg. ID 1271.) Likewise, Everest claims that Moak wrongly allowed Amerisure to present the Panel with a post-hearing submission supporting Amerisure's interest calculation, but the Panel ultimately rejected Amerisure's demand for interest. Finally, the Panel denied Amerisure's request for attorneys fees.
Everest argues that the Court should vacate the Final Award because the Panel's allegedly-erroneous procedural and evidentiary rulings deprived Everest of a fair hearing. Everest complains that the Panel wrongfully refused to allow Everest to introduce certain exhibits at the arbitration, interfered with its examination of lay and expert witnesses, unfairly favored and helped rehabilitate Amerisure's experts, and generally favored Amerisure at every opportunity. (See Everest Br., ECF #32 at 15-25, Pg. ID 1095-1105.) The short answer to this argument is that Everest's broad criticisms of the Panel are fundamentally inconsistent with Everest's answer to Moak's end-of-hearing question as to whether the Panel had given Everest a fair opportunity to present its case. As noted above, Everest identified only a single complaint in response to that inquiry. (Arb. Tr. at 3655-3566, ECF #40-6 at Pg. ID 1992-1993.) Everest is thus on extremely weak ground when it now claims to have been deprived of a fair arbitration hearing in myriad ways.
The longer answer is that "evidentiary decisions of arbitrators should be viewed with unusual deference," Terk Technologies Corp. v. Dockery, 86 F.Supp.2d 706, 709 (E.D.Mich.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Everest has fallen far short of showing that the Panel's evidentiary and procedural errors deprived Everest of a fair arbitration hearing.
Everest has failed to show that the Panel conducted the hearing in an unfair manner and/or that it suffered any unfair prejudice as a result of the manner in which the Panel conducted the hearing.
The Panel faced two primary issues of contract interpretation and application: (1) did the Direct Access Treaty permit Amerisure
The Panel ruled that the individual losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses could be treated as a single "occurrence" or "series of occurrences arising out of one event." (Final Award at 4-5, Pg. ID 185-186.) Under the FAA, this Court must affirm that ruling so long as, in reaching the ruling, the Panel was "even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of [its] authority." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir.2005). It was.
As described in detail above, the Panel first determined that the definition of "occurrence" — with its use of the undefined term "event" — was ambiguous as to whether it permitted aggregation. (See Final Award at 4, ¶¶ 2-3, Pg. ID 185.) This conclusion is hardly surprising, and is defensible, in light of the fact that "the two well-credentialed and articulate principal expert witnesses offered opinions of treaty interpretation that were totally at odds." (Id. at ¶ 2.) Indeed, given that each side asked the Panel to look beyond the "four corners" of the Direct Access Treaty and to consider expert testimony about the meaning of terms "occurrence" and "event," the Panel had every right to find the language ambiguous.
The Panel then "considered all of the conflicting interpretations presented on the treaty's occurrence definition (and the absence of an event definition)," and it found the interpretation offered by witness [
(Arb. Tr. at 503-506; 511-512, ECF #42-6 at Pg. ID 2223-2224.) The Panel found [
The Panel further considered and rejected the evidence that Everest offered in support of its argument that the Direct Access Treaty did not allow the aggregation of the individual losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses. The Panel found that evidence substantially less persuasive than the evidence offered by Amerisure. (See id. at ¶ 6.)
In short, the Panel followed a customary interpretive path. It first determined that an ambiguity allowed it to look beyond the four corners of the Direct Access Treaty. It then analyzed the competing extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the terms "occurrence" and "event" and as to whether aggregation of the individual losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses was consistent with those terms, as Amerisure argued. It found Amerisure's evidence more persuasive and adopted the interpretation supported by that evidence. That is classic — and reasonable — contract interpretation. Such interpretation fell squarely within the Panel's authority. The FAA bars this Court from upsetting that interpretation.
Everest counters that another passage in the Final Award proves that the Panel impermissibly deviated from the plain language of the "occurrence" definition. Everest points to the Panel's statements that
The Court acknowledges that the Panel's use of the present tense is a bit confounding. The Panel did not draw a connection between the current meaning of the disputed terms and the commonly accepted meaning of those terms when the parties entered into the Direct Access Treaty. Without such a link, the current meaning is not relevant to the issue that the Panel was asked to resolve: namely, when the parties executed the Direct Access Treaty, did they intend to allow aggregation of individual losses, like those that comprised Amerisure Asbestos Losses, into a single claim for indemnification?
Although the Panel did appear to consider the current meaning of the disputed terms, the Court is not convinced that the Panel actually rested its ruling on that meaning rather than upon their meaning when the parties entered the Direct Access Treaty. As described above, the Panel expressly relied on the testimony of a percipient witness who had a connection to the original drafting of the disputed language and upon the testimony of experts as to what that language meant. The Court is convinced that even though the Panel used some imprecise language in the Final Award, the Panel did engage in proper contract interpretation, and the Court cannot disturb that interpretation under the FAA. See, e.g., Solvay, 442 F.3d at 476.
Nor does Michigan law permit the Court to upset the Final Award on the ground that the Panel exceeded its powers in allowing aggregation of the individual losses that comprised the Amerisure Asbestos Losses. As explained in detail above, the Panel's resolution of the aggregation issue is not plainly at odds with any express and unambiguous term of the Direct Access Treaty, and, more specifically, is not fundamentally irreconcilable with the treaty's definition of "occurrence." Indeed, interpreting ambiguous contractual terms, as the Panel did in this case, is a far cry from exceeding an express contractual term in violation of Michigan law. See Muskegon Central Dispatch 911, 462 Fed.Appx. at 524-25 (explaining that an arbitrator does not exceed his powers under Michigan law where he "engag[es] in contract interpretation" but does exceed his powers when he ignores the "plain language" of a contract).
At bottom, Everest's argument that the Panel exceeded its authority by allowing aggregation is nothing more than an invitation to review the merits of the Panel's contract interpretation. The Michigan Supreme Court has directed courts to reject such an invitation. See Gordon Sel-Way, 475 N.W.2d at 704. This Court heeds that direction here, as it must.
As described in detail above (see pp. 2-5), the Direct Access Treaty (as amended in 1987) and the Woods Treaties both contained the Asbestos Exclusion and two possibly applicable exceptions to the Asbestos Exclusion. These exceptions were the Incidental Exception Language in the Asbestos Exclusion and the Generally-Applicable
The Panel considered both whether the Asbestos Exclusion applied and whether, even if the Amerisure Asbestos Losses would otherwise fall within that exclusion, Amerisure was nonetheless entitled to indemnification by operation of one of the two above-described exceptions to the exclusion. (See Final Award at 5-6, ¶¶ 8-12, Pg. ID 186-187.) The Panel resolved both issues in Amerisure's favor. The Panel first determined that the Asbestos Exclusion did not apply because [
The Court agrees with Everest that the Panel exceeded its powers when it concluded that Amerisure could avoid the Asbestos Exclusion on the ground that it did not know about [
The Panel acted directly contrary to the plain language of the Asbestos Exclusion — and thereby exceeded its powers — when it ruled that Amerisure could avoid the Asbestos Exclusion because it did not know about [
But the relevant question under the Asbestos Exclusion has nothing to do with Amerisure's subjective "underwriting judgment." The question is whether Amerisure objectively knew about [
Amerisure attempts to insulate the Panel's treatment of the knowledge issue from review. It argues that the Panel made a "factual finding" that Amerisure lacked knowledge, and it insists that under both the FAA and Michigan law, this Court may not review such a finding. (Amerisure Opposition Brief, ECF #40 at 1920, Pg. ID 1959-1960.) If the Panel had made such a finding, Amerisure would be right. But the Panel made no such finding. As described above, instead of finding that Amerisure did not know about [
As described in detail above, the Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the Treaties' Exclusions provided that even if one of the Treaties' enumerated exclusions would preclude indemnification for a loss caused by a product, Everest would nonetheless indemnify Amerisure if the product in question was a minor and incidental part of an insured's total products. (See Direct Access Treaty at 40-41, Pg. ID 279-280.) The Panel ruled that this exception was "applicable" and, thus, that the Asbestos Exclusion did not bar Amerisure from receiving indemnification from Everest. (Final Award at 6, ¶ 12, Pg. ID 187.) Everest has barely attempted to show — and certainly has not demonstrated — that the Panel exceeded its powers in concluding that the Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the Treaties' Exclusions was "applicable."
Indeed, even though Amerisure's briefing urged this Court to uphold the Panel's ruling that the Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the Treaties' Exclusions was "applicable" — and to confirm the Final Award, in part, on the basis of that ruling (see Amerisure Br., ECF #40 at 20-21, Pg. ID 1961-1962) — Everest's primary briefs do not even mention the exception.
Finally, in its post-hearing supplemental brief "addressing whether the FAA or Michigan arbitration law" governs, Everest complained in passing that the Panel "inexplicably rul[ed] that [
Everest has simply not carried its heavy burden to show that the Panel exceeded its powers when it concluded that the Generally-Applicable Incidental Exception to the
The Final Award required Everest to indemnify Amerisure for amounts that Amerisure paid to
The Panel's ruling that the
Here, the "jurisdictional" issue before the Court is not one of arbitrability that the Court reviews de novo. Indeed, the dispute over Everest's liability for the
The Court declines to disturb the Panel's ruling that the parties submitted their dispute over the
Everest admittedly had some support for its argument to the Panel that the
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court finds no justification to vacate, modify, or correct the Final Award. Accordingly, the Court must confirm the Final Award. See 9 U.S.C. § 9; Barcume v. City of Flint, 132 F.Supp.2d 549, 555 (E.D.Mich.2001); Gordon Sel-Way, 475 N.W.2d at 709 ("In this context, the court rules provide the court with three options: it may confirm, modify or correct, or vacate the award").
For all the reasons stated above,